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Are We There Yet? Laboratory Preparedness for
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Moderators: Carey-Ann D. Burnham1* and Jennie H. Kwon2
Experts: Eileen M. Burd,3 Sheldon Campbell,4,5 Peter C. Iwen,6 and Melissa B. Miller7
The West African Ebola virus epidemic of 2013–2016
was the most widespread epidemic of this disease in his-
tory; it is estimated that this occurrence contributed to
more than 11000 deaths. During the epidemic, health-
care workers (HCW)8 (including laboratorians) were
mobilized to care for individuals with suspected or con-
firmed Ebola virus disease (EVD). However, at the
height of the epidemic, guidance on appropriate safety
measures for laboratory workers manipulating specimens
from EVD patients was sparse. This highlighted the need
for data and guidelines for laboratories testing specimens
not only for patients with EVD, but for any emerging
infectious disease. During the Ebola epidemic, questions
were raised about the roles and responsibilities of laborato-
ries in responding to highly infectious diseases, and the bur-
den of ongoing readiness for rare events. As the outbreak
decelerates, laboratorians must regroup, gather data, and
prepare for future outbreaks.Wehave asked 4 experts in this
field to share their thoughts on contemporary challenges in
laboratory preparedness for emerging infectious diseases.
During the recent Ebola epidemic, what laboratory
testing did your hospital offer for patients with sus-
pected EVD? Who performed this testing and where
was the testing performed? Did you have dedicated
equipment for laboratory testing or did you utilize
existing core laboratory equipment?
Eileen Burd: Patients with clinical symptoms and appro-
priate epidemiologic risk factors for EVD were stratified
as high, intermediate, or low risk by the provider seeing
the patient. If evaluation revealed low risk or no identi-
fiable risk, standard tests were generally ordered that in-
cluded tests for diagnoses other than EVD including
complete blood count
(CBC) with differential,
complete metabolic pro-
file (CMP), and malaria
testing. Other tests that
were ordered as indicated
by the patient’s symptoms
included blood cultures,
respiratory virus testing,
urinalysis, urine culture,
and molecular gastrointes-
tinal panels. Blood and
other specimens were collected and placed in specimen
transport bags in the patient’s exam room and transported
to the main hospital laboratories per standard protocol.
If evaluation revealed that Ebola testing was indi-
cated, the Emory Serious Communicable Disease Unit
(SCDU) physician on call was contacted. If the SCDU
physician agreed, the SCDU laboratory director on call
was notified and the SCDU laboratory was activated. All
specimens were packaged and transported under Cate-
gory A precautions to the SCDU laboratory. Testing was
limited to the tests available in the SCDU laboratory and
no specimens were sent to the main laboratories in the
hospital until EVD was ruled by PCR. Ebola virus PCR
results were available in about 1.5 h after receipt of the
specimen in the SCDU laboratory. Other tests available
in the SCDUlaboratory includedCBC,CMP,magnesium,
lactate dehydrogenase, -glutamyl transferase, amylase, lac-
tate, phosphorous, venous/arterial blood gases, urinalysis,
FilmArray® gastrointestinal panel, FilmArray® respiratory
panel,BinaxNOW®malaria assay, andAlereDetermine™
HIV-1/2 Ag/Ab Combo test.
Testing in the SCDU laboratory is performed by
staff medical technologists who volunteer on a rotating
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on-call schedule so that laboratory services can be pro-
vided around the clock. The equipment in our SCDU
laboratory is dedicated for use only in that laboratory.
The major drawback of using dedicated equipment is the
expense, including the initial purchase and the cost of
maintaining equipment and space that is rarely used. In
addition, backup instruments are not available if an in-
strument becomes disabled.
Melissa Miller: Our ini-
tial plans focused on a per-
son under investigation
(PUI) likely presenting to
our emergency department
or an outpatient clinic with
the assumption that either
the laboratorywouldbeno-
tified by the clinical team,
or in the laboratory’s travel
history review for malaria
testing, we would identify
a biological safety cabinet (BSC) adjacent to an isolation
room in an intensive care unit (ICU). Laboratory person-
nel were trained and on call to staff the POC laboratory, as
needed. Until this laboratory was ready, our plan specified
that specimens be transported to Microbiology for centrif-
ugation and processing, as needed, before delivery to the
Core Laboratory for essential testing on designated devices
thatwould thenbedecontaminatedusing routineprotocols.
What is the current status of your emerging pathogens
laboratory?
Melissa Miller: The POC laboratory used during the
EVD epidemic has been decommissioned. However, we
have maintained procedures for ready deployment of the
laboratory should the need arise. The EVD epidemic and
risk to laboratorians was unique in that it impacted mul-
tiple areas of the clinical laboratory, including anatomic
pathology. Most of our epidemics and emerging patho-
gen concerns to date have relied primarily on the readi-
ness of the clinical microbiology laboratory. Our micro-
biology laboratorymaintains a secure, camera-monitored
“Emerging Pathogens Room” with a BSC and small in-
cubators and supplies. This dedicated room, along with
our mycobacteriology suite, provides continuous readi-
ness and security for most emerging pathogens.
Eileen Burd: The Emory SCDU Laboratory is at “ready
state.” An on-call schedule is generated each month with
2 medical technologists (1 testing technologist, 1 safety
technologist) and 1 laboratory director on call each 24-h
day, separate from their routine laboratory duties. The in-
struments in the laboratory are maintained by the technol-
ogists who are trained to run tests in the SCDU laboratory.
Quality control, calibration, and proficiency testing are per-
formed as appropriate for each assay or instrument.
What are some of the challenges that clinical labora-
tories encounter that hinder preparedness for emerg-
ing infectious diseases?
Sheldon Campbell: The
biggest challenge is the un-
known, intermittent, and
dynamic nature of the risk.
Emerging infections come
in different types—viral,
bacterial, fungal, parasitic;
by definition they appear
unexpectedly, and the out-
breaks vary from a dozen
cases to global pandemics.
Routes of transmission, du-
ration of risk before, during, and after symptoms, specific-
ity of the clinical syndrome, quantitative risk of a given
a potential PUI. We developed plans for the appropriate 
collection and transport of specimens to the clinical mi-
crobiology laboratory for Ebola testing performed by our 
State Laboratory of Public Health (SLPH) and the CDC, 
as well as the essential tests to support patient care with-
out undue risk to laboratorians. The on-site microbio-
logic testing offered for PUI was limited to blood cultures 
(collected in plastic bottles) and malaria smears (thin 
smear only), as indicated. All specimen processing per-
formed before inactivation procedures was performed in our 
mycobacteriology suite [biosafety level 2 (BSL2)] by 
personnel trained in donning and doffing personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE). Laboratory personnel were on call 
24/7 to provide this service.
Inherently problematic was the assumption that the 
laboratory would be notified of these cases. Extensive 
education, signage, and computer alerts (i.e., hard stop 
for required travel history and symptom review) were 
developed in an attempt to mitigate this risk. Unlike 
many past infectious disease epidemics, the impact to 
the clinical laboratory extended beyond microbiology. 
Core laboratory services, including chemistry and hema-
tology, were also challenged. Due to the concerns of con-
tamination of laboratory equipment and potential expo-
sure of laboratorians in a high-throughput laboratory, 
our institution elected to develop dedicated point of care 
(POC) services for PUI. We worked with local experts 
who had treated EVD patients in Africa and our infec-
tious disease and critical care colleagues to determine the 
“minimal necessary testing” for a critically ill PUI until 
they had been ruled out for EVD by the SLPH/CDC. 
Based on this list, POC instruments were reallocated 
and/or acquired for the sole purpose of testing PUIs. 
These instruments were placed in a dedicated room with
source-patient actually being infected, and level of infec-
tious risk in a given specimen type vary between out-
breaks, and our understanding of them evolves within the
span of a new outbreak. Secondly, clinical laboratories,
like all parts of the healthcare system, are under contin-
uous pressure to reduce costs and improve outcomes in
documentable ways. The efforts we make to prepare for
the latest outbreak tend to erode and be gone by the time
the next thing happens.
Peter Iwen: Major chal-
lenges for clinical laborato-
ries include inadequate
facilities for handling
specimens thatmight con-
tain a high-risk pathogen,
outdated or lack of appro-
priate equipment, and
insufficient number of
trained laboratorians. The
high cost to validate new
testing platforms that
might only be used rarely to assess specimens from a
highly infectious patient must be considered. Finally, the
need to provide for a proficiency and quality manage-
ment program over the long term along with the avail-
ability of staffing that can meet competency assessments
for this specialty laboratory will be an ongoing financial
challenge for hospital and laboratory administrators.
How can laboratories ensure that personnel maintain
competency with enhanced PPE and/or special equip-
ment or procedures outside of an epidemic setting?
Eileen Burd: All of the HCWs in the Emory SCDU are
required to demonstrate competency in using PPE each
quarter during routine periods when the SCDU is not
activated. Any changes inPPE equipment or procedures are
reviewed during the competency sessions. In addition to
quarterly competency, annual no-notice drills are held that
involve only the SCDU personnel on call that day. Annual
drills are organized and observed by the SCDU Medical
Director and Program Coordinator. These are “real-life”
exercises in which the SCDU is activated and a volunteer
“patient” is transferredby ambulance.The volunteer patient
is admitted to the SCDU and evaluated. Specimens are
taken and laboratory tests are performed as ordered. As in a
real event, a conference call is held in the afternoon todiscuss
patient status, review expectations, schedules, and Just-in-
Time Training. All members of the SCDU team, even if
they are not participating in the drill, are encouraged to join
the conference call or appoint a designee.
Sheldon Campbell: The only possible approach is to
practice and drill the procedures. This is very difficult to
sustain in the absence of an imminent threat; there’s al-
ways something more urgent to do. It might make more
sense for the rest of us to create skeletal procedures and
mechanisms that we build on when an event occurs, then
activate our training and procedures when an emerging
infection hits some threshold. But then, what’s the
threshold to activate the planning and start training?
What if you’re the first place hit?
In the setting of an outbreak of an emerging infectious
disease, how do clinical laboratories balance the risks
to patients and the risk to laboratory workers?
Eileen Burd: Outbreak situations generate a certain
amount of fear among hospital and laboratory staff. Hav-
ing emerging infectious disease protocols in place helps
lessen that fear. Individuals caring for, or testing, speci-
mens from known or suspected infected patients are un-
der additional stress and using the greatest protective
methods available is justified. Because initial symptoms
of emerging infectious disease may be nonspecific, as is
the case with EVD, it is not always possible to identify
infected patients early. It is crucial that standard precau-
tions are used consistently by all HCWs at all times.
Patients suspected or known to be infected with cer-
tain epidemiologically important pathogens such as
Ebola virus require additional control measures to pro-
tectHCWs and other patients. The goal is to provide care
as needed, but to minimize unnecessary contact with pa-
tients and avoid procedures that increase the risk of ex-
posure to infectious material. Some of the recommended
measures include limiting the number of people exposed
to the patient, isolating the patient in a room with the
door closed, implementing standard, contact, and drop-
let precautions, limiting invasive procedures to those es-
sential for patient care, using PPE, and appropriately de-
contaminating surfaces and equipment, etc.
The laboratory should provide a minimummenu of
tests for the diagnosis and evaluation of the patient, with
results available as quickly as possible. Risk of exposure
from spills or aerosols generated when testing patient
specimens can be minimized by limiting the number of
staff performing the tests and use of appropriate PPE.
Consideration should be given to segregating equipment
used for testing and performing laboratory tests in a ded-
icated space.
Sheldon Campbell: There’s no “right” answer to this.
Ideally, the impact on mortality of delayed or absent
laboratory testing could be balanced against the risk to
laboratory personnel and some greatest-good-for-the-
greatest-number calculation applied; in practice there’s
no way to make that calculation. I think the “abundance
of caution” formulation used in Ebola was unhelpful;
“abundance of caution” for whom, the laboratory or the
mendations, and the diagnostic tools desired. Nonethe-
less, with each new outbreak, we improve our readiness
on both a national and local scale for the next emerging
infectious disease. For example, the severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) epidemic took
months to identify the infectious agent and make its viral
sequence publicly available. At the time, this seemed
astoundingly rapid compared to previous emerging in-
fectious agents (e.g., HIV). The rapid availability of se-
quence data facilitated development of laboratory-
developed tests (LDTs) and epidemiologic studies that
informed an appropriate public health response. The lab-
oratory protocols thatmany of our institutions developed
for SARS were readily adapted in 2009 when we were
faced with the influenza pandemic. The pandemic
H1N1 (pdmH1N1) viral sequences were publicly avail-
able in weeks, which allowed for in silico analysis of FDA-
cleared laboratory tests, development of LDTs, and sub-
mission and approval of Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) tests. Likewise, we drew upon the lessons learned
from SARS and pandemic influenza to guide our pre-
paredness for theMiddle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV), and outbreaks with multidrug-
resistant Acinetobacter helped informed our preparedness
for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae outbreaks.
However, the EVD outbreak was more challenging
because most US laboratories did not have previous ex-
perience managing a highly virulent, BBP outbreak. But
we do have extensive experience in working with BBPs
and relied on our knowledge of transmission to guide our
laboratory practices. Nonetheless, the highly virulent na-
ture of the Ebola virus led to more fear and enhanced
precautions since the risk associated with improper pro-
cedures or simple mistakes was increased. The laboratory
needs associated with the next outbreak are unpredict-
able, but unifying needs for every outbreak are (a) rapid,
consistent communication from public health and fed-
eral entities, (b) data-driven recommendations, and (c)
adequate, sustainable funding to quickly mobilize local,
regional, and national responses.
Sheldon Campbell: We need templates for risk assess-
ment, reviewed and vetted by authoritative bodies. Guid-
ance during evolving events tends to be fragmented and
inconsistent, coming from multiple sources with differ-
ent recommendations. I’m not sure there’s a cure for that;
bright people working with limited data will arrive at
disparate conclusions, but it’s rough on the folks trying to
decide what to do. Regulatory support for ongoing pre-
paredness is necessary. In particular, the Joint Commis-
sion has tremendous power to drive the agenda of health-
care systems. Nothing happens without administrative
support and resources, and absent financial incentives;
regulatory support is essential. We also need a research
agenda which includes laboratories. There are a tremen-
patient? Laboratorians frequently mention what a large 
fraction of medical decisions involve laboratory results; 
with that in mind, we cannot consistently argue that “the 
laboratory results don’t matter that much in this case.” 
There needs to be a more robust dialogue, both within 
the laboratory community, and between laboratories and 
clinicians, about what levels of risk are acceptable, and 
what impact delaying or restricting laboratory testing will 
have on patients. Ideally this would be an evidence-
driven discussion; that may be another part of the re-
search agenda.
How do laboratories decontaminate laboratory equip-
ment used for testing clinical samples from patients with 
highly virulent infections?
Melissa Miller: To my knowledge, this is still largely an 
unanswered question. The CDC has provided guidance 
for surface decontamination, but defer to the manufac-
turers’ operator’s manuals for decontaminating internal 
components of equipment. The CDC states they are in 
consultation with the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and manufacturers to address these unanswered 
issues. Since there is no recommended method(s) for de-
contamination, or a validated method for assessing effec-
tiveness of any method, an instrument may have to be 
decommissioned if it becomes contaminated. These is-
sues, in part, led to our decision to implement POC 
testing devices for the essential laboratory tests needed to 
support the care of a critically ill PUI.
Peter Iwen: A wide range of methods have been de-
scribed by manufacturers to decontaminate equipment 
used to test specimens containing Ebola virus, ranging 
from minimal processes such as bleach wiping, to incin-
eration of the instrument after utilization. In many in-
stances where laboratories are being developed for the 
patient care biocontainment units, equipment is being 
dedicated to an in-unit or remote laboratory location that 
will be devoted to this unit. Scientifically validated stan-
dardized protocols for environmental disinfection have 
shown that fresh 10% bleach at a minimal contact time of 
5 min is highly effective to inactivate Ebola virus and 
most likely the other high consequence viral pathogens. 
To reemphasize, laboratory safety practices are not new 
concepts for the laboratory with blood-borne pathogen 
(BBP) safety standards that are already a standard of prac-
tice in the laboratory, which include barrier protection, 
gloves, gowns, and goggles.
What evidence, guidance, and diagnostic tools are 
needed for future outbreaks with emerging infections?
Melissa Miller: Each outbreak is unique in terms of the 
type of guidance needed, data available to inform recom-
dous number of unique unanswered questions out there,
particularly with regard to risks associated with labora-
tory systems and instrumentation.
What is the most important lesson for clinical labo-
ratories from the recent Ebola epidemic?
MelissaMiller:One important lesson I learned both as a
laboratory director and as a member of the American
Society for Microbiology (ASM) Committee on Labora-
tory Practices is the need for timely, effective communi-
cation. Communication was critical in every aspect of
EVD readiness planning. Reciprocal communication
with public health colleagues, coordination of efforts
among sections of the clinical laboratory, and discussions
with a wide variety of services (including infection con-
trol, emergency preparedness, waste management, criti-
cal care, transport services, and shipping companies,
among others) required clear, effective communication
to organize a cohesive readiness plan.
Peter Iwen:Many important lessons were learned during
the recent Ebola epidemic that were not originally antic-
ipated. One lesson learned while caring for patients with
EVD in theUSwas the critical requirement to have safety
protocols in place to process and test specimens that po-
tentially might have a high-risk pathogen. In addition,
open lines of communication between in-house medical
staff and external collaborators to include those at the
jurisdictional public health laboratory (PHL) were essen-
tial. Individuals in the PHL can provide guidance on the
screen assays available, provide for transportation of spec-
imens from the medical facility to the PHL, and interact
directly with the CDC laboratories when additional test-
ing is required. Finally, although many laboratories have
a program for the deposition of clinical specimens that
might include decontamination or the archiving of excess
clinical material, the “cradle to grave” concept of speci-
men tracking was recognized as an important issue that
all laboratories needed to consider. The ability to deter-
mine where high-risk specimens have been handled in
the laboratory, and to recognize individuals who may
have come in contact with the specimen, was important
to determine whomay be at risk for a laboratory-acquired
infection and the potential for community exposure. Ul-
timately, the lesson learned from the recent Ebola out-
break is that all laboratorians need to be prepared to
handle any specimen that could potentially harbor a
high-risk pathogen, that administrators need to be flexi-
ble and provide appropriate protocols to make sure that a
safe environment exists for the laboratorians, and that the
laboratory be able to provide support for optimal man-
agement in the care of the patient.
Sheldon Campbell: That it’s just one blasted thing after
another; we can never be certain what’s in that tube, so
continuous, minute-to-minute and day-to-day and
month-to-month attention to standard precautions and
continuous safety improvement is essential, not just
when there’s a high-profile outbreak, but all the time.
Like a sports team, we have to drill the fundamentals,
whether or not we’re going to get to the Big Game.
Eileen Burd: EVD is extremely hazardous because of the
highmortality, lack of proven therapeutics, and potential
for transmission. Very early after our first patient arrived,
it became obvious that in situations like this you have to
be flexible. The course of EVD is remarkably varied and
testing needs to be varied accordingly. Extra effort was
focused on communication between the care providers
and the laboratory. Our most severely ill patient required
many of the features of intensive care and the dynamics
and testing needs shifted, sometimes by the hour. Treat-
ing 2 patients at a time is different from treating only 1,
and laboratory personnel had to plan to spend longer
periods of time in the containment laboratory to accom-
modate the larger number of specimens. Throughout the
care of each patient every teammember needed to be able
to respond to change and adapt quickly. Flexibility al-
lowed our teams to adapt to the difficult task of caring for
these patients more adeptly.
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